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Governing through Educational Discourse 
The Case of Integration in Israel, 1970-1973 
 
Tali Yariv Mashal, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
Gilo Citizenship Democracy and Civic Education Center, Research Fellow 
 
 
Issues of ethnicity, culture, and national identity have been central in every political and social 
circle in Israel since the first days of the Zionist movement. The “new Jew,” a term created and 
lionized by the Zionist movement at the end of the 19th century, shadowed Israeli society and 
remained a critical part of the struggle for national identity and unity in the State of Israel after 
its independence in 1948. This Jew was to be a white, educated, westernized citizen, involved in 
both political and social processes, knowledgeable in the terms of the Western world. The 
concepts of the new Israeli-Jew completely ignored the fact that since the first days of the Zionist 
movement, the Middle Eastern Jew, born, raised and significantly involved in Arab countries, 
was a notable part of it and of the process of building the Jewish state of Israel.  
The term “integration” first entered the Israeli social scene during the 1960s, when 
political and social changes in the U.S. and Europe changed the global discussion of and 
reference to democracy, minorities, and rights. Concepts of civic struggle, political power, and 
social change quietly crept into Israeli reality, slowly influencing the ways people thought about 
and acted as part of the Israeli democratic civic society. At the same time, it was already in the 
1960s that social and economic inequality between Middle Eastern (Mizrahi) and 
European/American (Ashkenazi) Jews was a permanent feature of the Israeli society and created 
an unrest and discomfort among Mizrahi communities.  
With the gaps between the various Jewish communities becoming a significant social 
factor in Israel over the years, the discussion of integration among the various the Jewish 
communities became prominent, within and out of the educational scene. It signaled hope, 
dreams, disappointment, and, finally, despair. During a period of over ten years, the educational 
system in Israel had constantly tried to adopt and implement various “integration reforms,” every 
few years renewing old and familiar concepts, trying to conform them into a constantly changing 
reality.  
During the 1970s, the most significant factor in any educational change was the hope that 
by “mixing” children of different neighborhoods in the same schools, they would gradually open 
up to each other, and mutual influences would create not only educational excellence among 
students but also achieve social unity. As time passed, this proved to be a false hope. 
In March 1971, the Israeli public was introduced to a new form of political power: a 
civic, grassroots movement called the Israeli Black Panthers. The Panthers were a group of 
Mizrahi youth from a slum neighborhood in Jerusalem that called for greater governmental 
support for unprevieledged Jewish communities of Middle Eastern origin in Israel, a change in 
social welfare and educational policies.  The Panthers did not bring a new and unknown problem 
or, for that matter, argument, into the Israeli reality; what they brought was a new form of power, 
one that was threatening to the establishment and able to awaken much of the public from its 
social “coma.”. The actual existence of the problem was no surprise, but the fact that in March 
1971 it became loud was definitely threatening to the government and the political establishment.  
The two years in which the Black Panthers were at the height of their activity were the 
most significant in the process of creating a new discourse of integration in Israel. After the 
shock came the political solution: an ongoing effort to divert discussion on disparity to 
discussion on integration. From this point on, “ethnicity” and “integration” were two terms that 
would always go together, until “ethnicity” became “integration.” 
One of the significant points in this paper is the influence, although limited, of the 
educational system on the political sphere. It is my contention that the formation of discourse is a 
dialogue rather than an imposition of one power center over a weaker one. What had started as a 
reform that was precise in its sole educational goals (based on the assumption that simply by 
placing the children under the same roof, problems of difference and inequality would be solved) 
developed into an “integrated” approach that imposed responsibilities of welfare, health, and 
community building upon the educational system. Finally, this change imposed a re-thinking of 
governmental resources and distribution. In this paper, I will track some significant points within 
the dialogue between the educational and political establishment. It is my belief that by 
following this dialogue, it is possible to expose both social and political discourses and through 
them understand the power of education within a democratic state as well as the powers that 
influence the educational system as such.  
 
I: Zionism, Ethnicity and Discourses of Integration in Israel 
Although ethnicity was denied as a legitimate category by which to distinguish Jew from 
Jew in a utopian Israeli future, ethnic differences among Jews were, and are, highlighted. 
Ethnicity was always rejected as an ultimate principle, but acknowledged as a social fact.
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The manifestation of ethnic relations and multiculturalism within Jewish-Israeli society today is 
part of an ongoing process that began with the socialization of immigrants in Israel during the 
early years of Israel’s independence (in 1948). These relations touched upon issues of nation-
building, international developments, and political change. 
The political discussion regarding Mizrachim
2
 in Israel began in the 1950s with concepts 
of “culture-contact” and “absorption through modernization,” reflecting the view that non-
European immigrants came to Israel without having gone through modernization in their 
countries of origin. By the beginning of the 1960s, as social disparities became very apparent and 
the discomfort (both of the majority Ashkenazi and the minority Mizrachi community) from the 
economic, social, and cultural inequality gained significance in the political sphere, the 
“Sephardim”—the Ladino-speaking Jews and Arabic-speaking Middle Eastern Jews—were 
perceived, at least within the public discourse, as a homogenous group and were pushed into a 
marginal social space where they were looked upon as a community with various interesting 
ethnographic qualities.
3
  
By the beginning of the 1970s, as the congruence between socio-economic inequality and 
primordial socio-geographic origins became increasingly apparent, a form of political ethno-
class slowly but surely became a prominent feature of Israeli societal realities. For a nation-state 
that strived to fulfill an egalitarian vision of one land for one homogenous Jewish nation, such 
socio-economic inequalities could not be morally justified. How, then, would this morally 
unjustified development be rationalized? The Israeli political leadership sought its way out of 
this by the use of the concept of the “Eastern” or, in its Hebrew version, “Mizrachi” Jews. In the 
imagery of “Mizrachim,” the division of society by geographical origin was recast into social 
division by cultural characteristics. Those of the “East” were framed in various ways as such: 
[In formulating a discourse of “Mizrachim,”] the socioeconomic inequality, a stable 
sociological feature of Israeli society, is transformed into a transient quality, a negative 
development, which can be set right by further cultural change among low status citizens 
of North-African and Near-Eastern origins.
4
 
In the Israeli social structure that emerged during the 1970s, ‘cultural’ defined the 
differences between two major groups within it: the Western and the Eastern groups, with one 
opposing the other. In addition to the initial distinction of place of origin, forms of religious 
heritage were also a basis for this definition of culture and difference. This was a wide and 
precise way of distinguishing – of creating ‘cultures’ within the Israeli Jewish society. At the 
same time, there was an interesting process in which the term “Mizrachim” became significant 
for the young leadership growing within the Middle Eastern Jewish communities as a political 
definition of the marginal ethno-class (rather than a cultural other). It was, in fact, toward the 
“Easterners” as such that social and economic inequality was practiced, and it was this 
marginalized, and, by the new definition of ‘Mizrachim,’  homogenized group, that was calling, 
by the beginning of the 1970s, for political change.  
In this essay, I start my analysis in 1970, with the rise of the Israeli Black Panther 
movement, which was, in fact, the first political organization that perceived issues of cultural 
difference as political issues. I analyze the rise of the Black Panthers and the governmental 
reaction to this movement and point to the ways in which issues of welfare, economic disparity, 
and cultural disparity were all brought into the educational system through the policy of 
educational integration. I analyze different aspects of the discourse of ethnicity and education 
within the political sphere, and the ways in which this discussion ultimately governed social and 
education development in Israel: How did the political leadership talk about ethnicity and 
education? When and how did the Mizrachi minority talk about education? What did the 
Mizrachi voice mean for the Ashkenazi leadership? And, ultimately, why was education chosen 
by the government as the pervasive theme of ethno-political discourse in Israel during the 1970s? 
In my analysis, I highlight not only the role and effect of politics on education (a task that 
has undoubtedly been taken on by many) but also the ways in which education was used as a 
prominent political tool, giving, at times, political “proof” of social inequality and de-facto 
exclusion, and at other times providing a solution for such discrimination. In so doing, I attempt 
to offer an understanding of the creation of educational policies and the role and effect of 
education on the political discussion, and vice versa. By presenting the case of Israel, I hope to 
be able to demonstrate a much wider phenomenon of educational and political discourses and the 
interrelations between those discourses. 
In looking at the educational system as a political tool, I find it crucial to highlight its 
importance in processes of state formation and nationalism in Israel. Apart from the army, the 
educational system was considered the main means of social assimilation and national identity 
formation in Israel. In the Zionist movement, education was historically considered a crucial 
socialization tool, one that followed the Jewish tradition of community building and bonding 
through religious study and the written word. This Zionist tradition was linked to the European-
Jewish heritage and evidently posed yet another assumed difficulty for the “culture-contact” of 
the Mizrachi students, as their ways of Jewish studies were historically different.
5
 Zionism’s 
origin in ideas of modernization in Europe had a marked influence on every aspect of political 
and social life in Israel. I will briefly describe this in order to allow a better understanding of the 
circumstances in which many of the ideas discussed in this essay arose. 
 
II: Theoretical Background: Integration as a Post-Colonial
6
 Discourse in Israel 
In conceptualizing the Israeli nation-building process as a colonial regime, Yiftachel and Meir
7
 
suggest an account of an “ethnic-survival” form of colonization as the most appropriate in 
analyzing historical social changes in Israel. Accordingly, it was a particularly territorial rather 
than economic form of colonization, and it was highly intransigent due to the status of most 
colonizers as refugees who were literally fighting for survival (Jews who arrived from both 
Europe and later the Middle East as refugees). In addition, it had a specific, Central and Eastern 
European character and was set a priori as a project of ethno-national nation- and state-building 
(as opposed to other colonial societies where local nationalism developed later). Israeli nation 
building was a project designed to establish an ethno-national-territorial identity, based on a 
reconstructed “imagined” Jewish past and unity. Israeli state-building was a complementary 
project intended to establish territorial and institutional infrastructures for reviving and 
reformulating the nation.
8
 
In my description of culture, I borrow Arjun Appadurai’s genealogy of the term
9
: hence, 
“culture” and “cultural” in this framework would be regarded as dimensions of social and 
political discourse that use ideas of difference in order to create diverse groupings or, for that 
matter, group identities. Both geographical origin and difference in Jewish religious heritage 
became the basis for the definition of ‘others’ among the Jewish population. This basic “cultural” 
distinction would eventually produce a circumstantial concept of “ethnicity.” Here, again, 
difference plays a major role, as these are initially imaginative historical dimensions of groups. 
The definition of Israeli-Jewish ethnicity, hence, rested on an extension of the cultural difference 
into geographical histories, reinforced by one’s appearance: the color of one’s skin, eyes, hair – 
external appearances that would place one in specific categories of ‘ethnicity’ on top of the 
initial categorization of ‘culture’.  In this essay I will be using the terms ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’ 
as inseparable terms relating both as one to the creation of difference within the Jewish 
population in Israel.  
In looking at various sources of the discourse of ethnicity and integration within the 
political-educational sphere, I have no intention of proving that discrimination existed, or of 
highlighting any forms of injustice within the schooling and educational systems. The main 
thrust of my argument is that, by the beginning of the 1970s, the internal Jewish-Israeli ethnic 
discourse had evolved into a post-colonial one. A different self-consciousness of identities, roles, 
and classes emerged as part of the larger nationalistic shifts in Israel and in the international 
Western scene, of which the State of Israel strived to be a part. These shifts ultimately created a 
historical rupture that touched issues of Jewish cultures and ethnicities. The social and political 
background of this rupture, the actions of the political leadership and those of the opposition, not 
only changed the realities of the political leadership and government, but also that of the 
Mizrachi Jews on the margins of Israeli society.  
I am aware of the possible critique of using terms such ‘colonialism’ and theories of post-
colonialism in regard to a group that was in no way physically occupied or colonized by another. 
This is especially notable with respect to the Israeli – Jewish society that has colonized the 
Palestinian people since gaining independence in 1948. I do not mean to equate Palestinian and 
Mizrachi suffering in Israel; obviously Palestinians are those most egregiously wronged by 
Zionism. Nor do I have any intention of comparing the wrong suffered by these two groups.  The 
point is rather the affinity of one aspect of discrimination to another, the ever-so-easy transition 
between the ‘Arab’ and the ‘Middle Eastern’ and the link of dishonor towards both: ‘The 
colonial realities are not simply a reservoir or ‘raw’ political experiences and practices …they 
are also the scene of intense discursive and conceptual activity’
10
. It is within this discursive 
space that I wish to place this article: as part of a creation of a national ideology and, eventually, 
identity that is embedded within a discourse of colonial thinking and that is in many ways based 
on the myth and belief in power and control over the ‘other’. That other, in Israeli reality, turned 
to be anything other than European, anything related to the Middle East or, for that matter, 
‘Arabness’. I believe it is crucial for postcolonial theory to take seriously the psychological 
implications of colonialism on every dimension of national being; to this end, it needs to 
historically trace those ways in which the West turned into the ‘good,’ the East became ‘the bad’ 
and accordingly, culture was established and monumented. 
 In regard to the power of education and its relation to power, my initial hypothesis is that 
the school system in Israel was used as a “technology of power,”
11
 a Foucauldian term that 
implies the manipulation by different power structures (mainly political) in the formation of 
social “reality”—the formation of discourse. In using a political approach to educational 
analysis, I find a direct link between governmental and educational change. I assume that hidden 
tensions exist between competing social values inside the schools and within the wider 
educational system. When these values are triggered by external events, individuals and groups 
demand changes that are eventually reached by political tradeoffs. Although these tradeoffs are 
bound to have an effect on the schooling system, the schooling system itself will not only 
indigenize
12
 the change and the reform into the specific school setting, but will, eventually, have 
a counter-effect on the social and political sphere. Hence, a dialogue between the educational 
system and the political sphere develops eternally.
13
 By taking a major role in the social 
processes that occurred in Israel, the education system enabled certain practices and authorized 
specific ideas about what should be the character of the “Israeli Jewish Democratic State” and 
within it the “Israeli Jewish Democratic Citizen.” The school system was a part of the 
normalization process in which social reasoning excluded certain parts of Israeli society, 
included others, and created a form of political reasoning and action that was manageable and 
“governmental.” 
 
III: Historical Background: The Israeli Black Panthers, 1971-1973 
In June 1967, Israel engaged in the Six-Day War. During the years following this war, problems 
of security were exacerbated, and authorities tended to neglect internal social problems. But after 
a cease-fire was achieved in 1970, the frontiers were quiet. Many Israelis then turned their 
attention from grave national problems to personal, day-to-day grievances, and became more 
aware of internal political and social issues. Within an atmosphere of euphoria after the victory 
of the war, an improvement in the economic status of the state and its citizens and an optimism 
regarding Israel’s ability to protect itself from the Arab enemy, one particular set of 
circumstances sparked the fire of a group of second generation Mizrachi youth: changes in the 
nature of immigration to Israel and in the “absorption policies” of the authorities. The 
immigrants who came after 1967 were mostly Eastern European Jews (many of whom came 
between 1968-1970 when Eastern-European authorities allowed them to leave) and immigrants 
coming from Western states (mainly the USA and South Africa). Relative to the standards of 
immigration policies in previous years, the authorities treated the new immigrants exceptionally 
favorably.
14
 The correlation between immigration and low socio-economic status, so common in 
Israel since the creation of the state, disappeared. The European immigrants had been 
accustomed to a relatively high standard of living, and the authorities were anxious to give them 
any possible assistance. Their arrival was heralded as the realization of the Zionist dream.  
All this contrasted sharply with the welcome given the Mizrachi immigrants when they 
had immigrated, as well as with the treatment given to them during their many years in the 
country. These disparities were interpreted by the members of the second generation of 
Mizrachim as yet another indication of the state’s discriminatory policy. In the case of the 
Mizrachi youth of the slum neighborhoods of Jerusalem, this particular case was exacerbated by 
the establishment of new neighborhoods for the new immigrants in the vicinity of their own. 
While geographically these neighborhoods were so close, they were miles apart by any other 
standard. 
The “Black Panthers” organization in Jerusalem started as a community-based group in 
one of Jerusalem’s community centers (MATNAS) in the slum neighborhood of Musrara and 
quickly turned into a significant national political movement that brought about a new discourse 
of ethnicity as well as new ideas regarding social rights, democratic governance and equal 
opportunity.  
Initially, the major scope of the Panthers’ activity had to do with the efforts to improve 
their social and physical conditions within the community centers. But with the attention the 
organization got, the Israeli Panthers quickly broadened their argument and called for wider 
social change. Even more so, after the first report on the Black Panthers was published, they 
were exposed to social and academic figures that helped shape their protest. Links were 
established between the group and the leftist organizations of “Mazpem” and “SIAH” (the Israeli 
New Left).
15
 Through the connection with these organizations, the group members were exposed 
to Marxist writings, and some of them even adopted a class-based approach in analyzing their 
own social condition.
 16
 With a growing group of supporters and advisors, and with a response 
that was initially much greater and demanding than they had expected, the Panthers quickly 
understood the responsibilities their organization had and they created their forms of action: 
We didn’t have any method of action, because we had no backing and no resources. We 
were young and we didn’t have the budget. The government had a wide field of actions 
and resources with which to fight us … the government of that time created a situation, in 
which we had to fight the establishment, and our path was demonstrations-police-court.
17
 
The rhetoric that grew out of the Panthers’ activities was a new phenomenon in the Israeli 
political scene and signaled the creation of a new political rationalization in Israel. It was no 
longer enforced as only an internal, local argument, but one that touched the Western-
Democratic regime as such, having to do with international goals and aspirations as much as with 
the internal political scene. The name the group had chosen was a first step in creating a new 
discourse: in the first article on the Panthers—published in January 1971—one of the group 
leaders made a reference to the American Black Panthers, proclaiming: “We will be like the 
‘Black Panthers’ in the sense of being militant and frightening the establishment.”
18
 This 
reference was picked up by the journalist who used it in the article. It was immediately referred 
to by Prime Minister Golda Meir and finally adopted by the group leaders: 
Sa’adia came up with the name “Black Panthers.” The idea was to frighten Golda 
[Meir].
19
 She said that this name wouldn’t let her sleep. That’s what we wanted. We 
succeeded. With this name we changed the entire discourse between the social 
movements and the establishment.
20
 
The reference to the American Black Panthers was reinforced throughout the Panthers’ 
actions and rhetoric, although there was never any contact between the Israeli and American 
groups. In numerous interviews, members of the Israeli Black Panthers claimed that they did not 
really know what the American group stood for but were fascinated by the strength and influence 
the group had in the U.S. and chose the name as a populist move more than anything else: “We 
needed a way to publicize our cause.”
21
 
Beyond the Panthers’ immediate argument against material discrimination, there was a 
larger issue of symbolic neglect. The Panthers’ protest was largely intended to vent feelings of 
exclusion: “Golda, teach us Yiddish” was one of the slogans in the Jerusalem Panther 
demonstration (the biggest demonstration the Panthers organized in May 1971), asserting the 
feeling that only those who know the European-Jewish language of Yiddish could become a part 
of the Israeli society. The main thrust of the Black Panthers was against the government. They 
held the authorities responsible for the demoralizing effects of the slum conditions on Mizrachi 
youth; they wanted these youth to be taken within the fold and rehabilitated, or upgraded, for 
example, by admitting them to elite army positions, or to elite high schools.
22
 Although the 
Panthers wrote no formal platform, it is possible to outline their specific demands quite clearly. 
Of primary importance was education: to break the cycle of poverty, the Panthers demanded the 
establishment of “long day schools.” They also wanted better teachers and a more widespread 
system of scholarships for poor Mizrachi students whose families could not afford to pay high-
school tuition fees.
23
 
Due to the Israeli Panthers’ problematic political position as an ethnic minority group 
with no contacts with national political powers and a desire to draw as much public attention as 
possible, their tactics, rhetoric, and ways of protest were usually bold and dramatic. They relied 
heavily on demonstrations in large cities; placards and chants emphasized poverty, 
discrimination, and a demand for equality in educational opportunities and housing conditions of 
the Mizrachi community; they emphasized the use of the term “Blacks” when referring to the 
Mizrachi community; and often the language chosen toward the government was characterized 
by mocking taunts. For example, in the Panthers’ demonstrations, there were signs reading: “The 
Hell with It,” “Teach us Yiddish Golda,” “We are the dogs from Musrara,” and a coffin with a 
sign reading “Discrimination” on it. The Panthers’ “formal” sign was a closed black fist 
(standing both for “stop” and “fight back”); the members of the group wore black t-shirts with 
“Black Panther” written on them in white. The demonstrations were often very heated and at 
times violent, with police intervention and arrests occurring often.  
Already in January 1971, after the very first reports about the Black Panthers were 
published in local newspapers in Jerusalem and in national television news broadcasts, the 
Jerusalem Municipality initiated a committee to look at “ways to prevent youth involvement in 
unlawful actions.” Their main mission was to look at the youth involved in the Black Panther 
movement and ways to prevent that involvement. In its final report, published in February 1971, 
the committee wrote: 
1. The committee is extremely worried from the ways in which the media and the public 
television had treated the issue [of the Black Panthers]. This publicity caused the 
public to think the problem [of ethnicity in Jerusalem] is much greater and the 
condition far worse than the actual situation… 
2. We are in fact dealing with a small group of about 20 youth, 70 percent of them with 
criminal history, 6-7 of them criminals with serious past charges.
24
 
These conclusions are an example of the initial public and media response to the Panthers.  The 
rhetoric the group used and the publicity they received were definitely unsettling to the 
government. On April 13, 1971, the Panthers’ leaders met with Prime Minister Golda Meir in her 
office. The discussion between Meir and the Panthers is a wonderful example of the power of the 
Panthers’ rhetoric: 
G. Meir: How did you choose the name Black Panthers? 
R. Abergil: Just us … we sat together a few friends and thought … that people like us, or 
Sephardim … tried all kinds of names, like … the organization for the Sephardim or for 
the Iraqis … different movements tried this thing and no one heard their cry. 
G. Meir: How did you think of your name? 
R. Abergil: There is an organization “Katamon for Katamon” and a few other 
organizations that came up over the years; they all either disappeared or fell asleep. This 
name [Black Panthers] is a reviving and vulnerable name. 
G. Meir: Where did you find it? 
R. Abergil: It’s a vulnerable name. 
G. Meir: Didn’t you hear of it somewhere else? 
R. Abergil: We know about them
25
 that they support the P.L.O.
26
 and that they are 
against Jews. 
G. Meir: Then why did you choose this name? 
S. Marziano: Because it gave us the punch line, it awakened everyone around us, it made 
everybody respond. 
R. Abergil: About the name, it may be that we adopt about 40 percent of the American 
Black Panthers’ ideology, they were also deprived, screwed, and the fact that they are 
violent—we’re not. 
G. Meir: They are also anti-Semitic. 
R. Abergil: We are dedicated to our country; we are patriots and we love the country. 
The fact is that we are aware of the problem that keeps our children and us behind, and 
we want our children to go to the army, we want them to be healthy and worthy of 
serving in the army, and [we think] they should be nurtured for that—that proves this 
point.
27
 
A few important points rise already from this initial meeting between the Panthers and 
Prime Minister Meir. First, note Meir’s tone: she was obviously trying to make a point in 
discussing the name with the leaders, and—even more so—she was trying to educate them. From 
the standpoint of the political establishment, Meir representing its most significant leadership, 
the Panthers were unaware of the meaning of the name they had chosen and did not know the 
“truth” about the American Black Panther organization.  
Looking at the Panthers’ response to Meir’s words, another important issue comes up: 
The young leaders of the group were in no way shedding their Zionist loyalty or calling for a 
separation from the state institutions. On the contrary, Abergil, one of the core leaders of the 
group, was clearly stating that the goal was to create a better chance for Mizrachi children to fit 
into the state institutions, namely, the army. This is a very strong statement of loyalty to the 
country. Within the Israeli-Zionist discourse, one’s loyalty to the nation is ultimately tested in the 
army: the unit one is admitted to will be part of his/her adult identity and will determine much of 
the social status one will achieve.
28
 This initial respect to the establishment and call for the 
inclusion of the Mizrachim in Israeli society is apparent in many of the Panthers’ interviews 
during 1971. In an interview with the Panthers after the meeting with Golda Meir, Raffi 
Marciano, one of the Panthers, described the conversation: 
We told her: Dear Golda, hundreds of children, some of them criminals and some aren’t, 
but they are all discriminated, they all think of you as their mother. You are our 
children’s mother, you are our mother. If you won’t help us today, who will? Who will be 
the mother that will help us? Please, be aware of our problems and do everything you can 
to help us and to help our country.
29
 
Still, when looking at the government’s response to the Panthers, there was a clear lack of 
respect toward the group and an assumption that a short “re-education” would solve the 
problematic tones. Meir’s words to the press implied her lack of respect and her deeply colonial 
thinking in regard to the abilities and the importance of the group. In an interview she gave right 
after the meeting with the Panthers, her first sentence was: “They are not good boys and I doubt 
they will ever be good boys.”
30
 In the yearly Government report of 1972, under the title “Social 
and Economic Problems,” Meir wrote: 
Many of the people coming from Middle Eastern lands brought with them a load of 
discrimination from their lands of origin. The Jews coming to our country from Islamic 
countries were much smarter and better than the social environment in which they were 
situated, but their fate was such that they lived in countries that were not developed—in 
their educational industrial or cultural levels, and hence these Jews were deprived of their 
right to develop their own talent and to bring their intellectual abilities to their best, to 
study and learn like those of us coming from developed places like Europe or America.
31
 
These responses to the Panthers’ activity and the clear disrespect, along with the fear of the 
growing influence of the group, only enhanced the group’s actions. 
As the Panthers grew larger in numbers and influence, their rhetoric became increasingly 
radical. Specific references to “the authority” and “the establishment” were made, and a much 
more structured list of demands was created. Within their radical rhetoric, a call for inclusion 
was still apparent, and for most of the time, the basis for any demand or dialogue with authorities 
was the Panthers’ desire to be included within the existing social and political structures. The 
ways of influence and political participation may have been blurred, but the goal was clear: the 
Panthers wanted to become "Israeli,” or, for that matter, “Israeli-Mizrachim,” referring to the 
goal that their culture and history be included in the Israeli social scene and considered an 
integral part of the Israeli state and culture. They wished to develop, with the help of the 
educational system and the political establishment, the “backward” Mizrachi community and to 
turn this community into an equal participant in the modernized Israeli identity. 
As I will present in the next section, almost all the discussions regarding ethnic tension in 
the Knesset started as general assembly discussions that were to deal with more specific issues, 
such as housing policies, police actions, and education. At times, they did in fact touch upon 
these issues; but in the vast majority of the discussions, the suggested “solution” to social and 
economic disparities came as a re-assertion of the educational goal of equality in educational 
opportunities and a call to create a more integrated educational social environment. This is an 
astonishing documentation of the colonial ethnic discourse so dominant in the political system at 
the time. 
IV: Governing through Education: Political Discussions Regarding Social and Cultural 
Inequality  
The Initial Parliament and Government Reaction to the Black Panthers 
The first demonstration of the Black Panthers took place in Jerusalem on March 3, 1971. A week 
later, on March 10, the Knesset held a special hearing dedicated to the Black Panthers. In this 
very long discussion (in which as many as 15 speeches on the Black Panthers were given by 
Knesset members), three main issues were discussed: the reasons for the uprising of such a 
marginal group of youth, the reasons for their apparent success, and the possible solutions and 
actions that the government should be initiating in regard to the actual claims of the group. 
Much of the discussion was based on the recommendations of the Melamed Committee 
(of the Jerusalem municipality) and hence dealt, for the main part, with the rhetoric of the group 
and the more general questions regarding problems of “marginal youth” (a definition that many 
of the Knesset members chose to use in regard to the Panthers). 
In the first speech in this session, the speaker, Knesset member Porush, concluded: 
… There is a single source for all this: in that we did not think enough of the education of 
these children. Jewish education, education for Tora
32
 and Mizvah
33
—that is the vaccine; 
that is historically what vaccinated our youth in the Jewish history and prevented it from 
sinking for centuries.
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Porush was a member of the ultra-Orthodox party, and hence his remarks concerning “Jewish 
education” are almost expected. But the speaker that spoke after him was Knesset member 
Bibi—of the Labor Party: 
The crisis of our youth is not only economic, but mainly a cultural and spiritual crisis … 
we must see that the youth that was lucky and had better education and social 
circumstances become a partner of the youth whose fate was different and help them 
relieve their misery.
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Avraham Katz, of the Liberal Mahal Party, was very clear as to how the problems of “troubled 
youth” should be addressed: 
Getting the social environment [of these children] healthier is a necessary step, even if 
not enough. But this would be a long and expensive process. I believe that at this stage 
we should concentrate our human and financial recourses at the weakest link, that which 
causes these children to drop out of school …
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The last speaker in this discussion, before the government response, was Knesset member 
Moshe Zvi Neria of the MAFDAL, the Jewish conservative party: “We should work through the 
schools: a good family will adopt a backward family, the children will sit next to each other in 
school, and help each other.”
37
 The government response to the Knesset members’ words came 
from two representatives: the Minister of Welfare and the Minister of Police (who addressed 
issues of handling the police response to the Panthers demonstrations). I find Minister of Welfare 
Hazani’s words especially interesting: 
It is a shame, I must say, that our society awakens to its poor and desperate only when, I 
would say, “social accidents” such as the Black Panthers happen ... and then all of a 
sudden we all awaken and create a much exaggerated picture of a specific case, such as 
this case of a group of youngsters in Jerusalem. 
Hazani then gave yet another list of possible causes for the group’s actions, once again sounding 
voices that claim for the “the lack of those morals and norms that have guided our people for 
centuries among the young Mizrachi community,” “the lack of norms that call for hard work, the 
jealousy towards those who have achieved,” and, of course, the “crisis of coming from Islamic 
countries to Israel.”
38
 
It was suggested that a special Knesset committee be established to “discuss the problems 
and possible steps to correct economic, educational and social disparities.” Prime Minister Golda 
Meir did, in fact, declare a special committee to deal with the disparities in Israeli society a few 
days later. It was only in June of 1973 that the conclusions and recommendations of this 
committee were published.  But from this point on, the discussion of ethnic disparities and 
inequality shifted, as I will demonstrate below, into a discussion of equal educational opportunity 
and means of educational integration. Every reference I found in Knesset or governmental 
documents regarding ethnic inequality and discrimination was either part of a discussion 
regarding education or was shifted toward such discussion. I will present these trends in the next 
section.  
Knesset Committees and Further Discussion of Social Economic and Educational Disparities in 
the Knesset and Beyond 
During the weeks after the discussion in the Knesset, the Israeli media was preoccupied with 
issues of social and economic disparity. Issues of poverty, juvenile delinquency, and educational 
disparity were discussed constantly during March and April of 1971. At the same time, the Black 
Panthers were at the peak of their activity: they were frequently interviewed and discussed in the 
media; they organized “shadow groups” in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and development towns, and they 
held demonstrations in these places. In May 1971, they organized their biggest and most notable 
demonstrations in Jerusalem. 
Government officials, on the other hand, constantly tried to shift the discussion away 
from the apparent injustices as were described by the Panthers.  In numerous interviews, Finance 
Minister Sapir claimed that the achievements of the government were underemphasized and that 
the problem of social disparity was not nearly as bad as it appeared: “I think these talks about 
poverty are exaggerated”;
39
 “when they will ask me what I did to help reduce poverty, I will be 
very proud of my actions”;
40
 “what we should be worried about is staying united regardless of 
our differences. Need I refresh your memory as to the immigrant camps that we had just a few 
years ago? Do you think we can get rid of our social problems in only a few years?”
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In an article regarding educational disparities in Jerusalem, Ha’aretz publicist Uzi 
Benziman (a well known and widely read publicist in Israel) wrote an article under the title: 
“Exaggerated Reports over Jerusalem schools”.
42
 This article claimed that, as reported by 
Ministry officials, the children from Katamon (the neighborhood in Jerusalem which was the 
center of the Panthers’ activities) did not want, for various reasons, to come to a new school that 
was built close to their neighborhood and attracted many of the Ashkenazi families, although 
they were offered a chance to do so.  
At the same time, the tone calling for an integral ministerial approach was widely 
highlighted by the more scholarly published media. In fact, many of the editorial articles related 
to issues of social disparity spoke against the government’s response to the civic uprising, and 
claimed that concentrating on education was not enough. Many of the publicists, scholars, and 
civic activists called for wide reform that would deal with aspects of housing, community 
facilities, family, and health education.
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 On the other hand, the larger headlines of the news 
media called for a vast educational change. On March 26, for example, on the front news pages 
of Yediot Ahronot, the headline of an interview with Yizhak Shapira, a well-known educator in 
Israel, read: “The Panthers’ Roots Can Be Found in Elementary School.” In the article, Shapira 
asserted that “the basis of all this is education … if we had a much more intensive and integrated 
school system, this would not have happened.”
44
  
Although in many of the discussions in the Knesset and in the media a call for an integral 
approach for social and economic disparities was apparent, within the Knesset committees I did 
not find any related discussions in committees on welfare, finance, or health. The only related 
discussions I found were within the Education committee of the Knesset, reasserting the 
importance of education for any social process in Israel. In one of the first discussions, Elad 
Peled, the Ministry’s executive director, said: 
[in trying to create social integration in Jerusalem] we are confronting a difficult 
dilemma: on the one hand, there is a strong social pressure coming from residents of slum 
neighborhoods that are demanding a better chance. This is a legitimate pressure that we 
cannot ignore. On the other hand, there is the pressure coming from the Ashkenazim, the 
educated, the smaller families, the parents who want the best for their children. And we, 
those sitting in the ministry on behalf of the establishment, have to walk between the 
drops and try to stay dry … if we decide anything drastic—we will without a doubt 
irritate one side or the other … what we need is to keep it steady.
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Peled’s metaphor of “walking between the drops and staying dry” correlates to Rachel 
Elboim-Dror’s description of educational policy-making in Israel.
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 In this description, Elboim-
Dror states that one of the most apparent characteristics of educational policy-making in Israel is 
the Ministry’s ability to “ignore, veil or mitigate differences … in order to avoid touching a 
wound which might erupt in a ‘cultural war.’”
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 Peled’s words are not a surprise under the 
circumstances. It is precisely for this reason that this committee was discussing the issue of 
disparity in the educational system in Jerusalem now: by discussing, without issuing any 
recommendations or decisions for implementation for the Ministry of Education, the Knesset 
was creating the most fruitful outcome (one that was comfortable to all parties); it was sending 
the message that the issue was being discussed, that a solution would, eventually, be found; it 
was governmentalizing the public response through discourse, no more.  Time, for that matter, 
was the most important political tool: “It is the Israeli answer to satisfying most of the people 
some of the time. It is a kind on on-going, slow-motion, never-ending decision process, evolving 
bit by bit, allowing each group to obtain part of its demands.”
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Rarely, a more constructive voice would be heard in the government discussions: for 
example, among the visitors at this particular meeting, there was a school principal. Mr. 
Gotterman, the principal of the school in the slum neighborhood of Ir-Ganim, which was the 
focus of this discussion, dealt with issues of ethnic disparity on a daily basis and tried to express 
a more practical approach: 
I have no intentions of hurting anybody’s feelings, but I do want to touch the actual 
problem in this discussion. You say that you want to create educational integration. Did 
you ever think about what this “integration” is … and not only from the standpoint of 
announcing it as “the integration reform”? … announcing “integration” is nothing if it 
does not have real meaning behind it.
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Note, once again: from this straightforward statement, a new discussion arose in the 
committee concerning the meaning behind the “integration reform” and the ways in which one 
would be able to overcome it. All the Knesset members on the committee called for a stronger 
hand in the implementation of the reform: 
Knesset Member Levine: 15 kids in a slum school won’t make a difference…. 
Knesset Member Raziel-Naor: … the problem is that parents don’t want their children 
to study alongside children from the Mizrachi community. They are afraid of bad 
influence on their children…. We need to do something in the education system and in 
the municipality to get these people’s hearts closer to each other…. 
Knesset Member Feinberg-Serani: I think we should make sure the integration starts 
very early in the schooling process … as early as pre-school. 
Knesset Member Herman: The issue is about educating the public…. I want to know 
how the public officials in the schooling system are educated so that they can better deal 
with problems of ethnicity.
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Although the issues raised by the school principal had to do with various aspects of ethnicity and 
education, as well as with the problematics of implementing an “integration” reform that was 
opaque and unclear to educators, none of the Knesset members took the discussion any farther 
than questioning how the system could better implement this opaque construction of ‘educational 
integration’; there were no suggestions beyond the very basic discussion regarding “the reform” 
(a concept orphaned of any clear definition).  
It is clear, from the discussions quoted here,
51
 that the government sought to quiet social 
unrest through the discussion of education, through the influences of inscribed educational 
changes that were to be the solution to many of the ethnic-based tensions. But in fact, very little 
was done within the educational sphere; governmentalization, as it came, remained within the 
political discursive sphere. Note these words, of the Ministry of Education executive director: 
The integration policy is only a fraction of what should be a wide social policy of the 
state, as much as such exists … we can do a lot at school, but the child’s destiny will not 
change only by education and school. This said, it is obvious that we consider the 
integration policy a crucial part of education in Israel and believe integration can in fact 
change social circumstances, but all under the understanding that the educational 
system’s abilities are limited.
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Peled then went on to give a long and detailed review of the problems and difficulties of 
implementation of the integration reform. One of the most interesting points he raised had to do 
with the political difficulties of the reform: 
One of the things we are constantly trying to form is a clear definition of our goal, 
meaning—what are we trying to achieve in every stage of the reform … in this respect, 
the educational leadership in our country has never consolidated a clear definition, and in 
this we are not a rare case in the world.
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In October 1973, the Yom Kippur War broke out-- the hardest and most painful war the 
State of Israel had gone through up to that point. The elections were postponed until December 
31, 1973, and once again discussions of social importance were set aside.  
Conclusion 
As I stated in the theoretical section, I base my perception of culture on Arjun Appadurai’s 
genealogy of the term. Accordingly, “cultures” “are multiple dimensions of societal differences 
that create diverse groupings.”
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  To this basic definition, I would like to add another dimension: 
that of discourse. Culture, and the forms through which it is produced, can be seen as multiple 
discourses, occasionally coming together; at times, this would be an interaction of acceptance; at 
times, one of conflict. By discourse I am referring to the concept of “truth,” that is, an 
everlasting configuration of social and political ideas and ideologies that, through various 
sophisticated forms of power and sovereignty, are constructed as “absolute” and unchangeable. 
But, in fact, changes of “truth” have an inevitable effect on the perceptions of differences, and on 
the relations between one group and another. Hence, shifts of discourse create change of 
cultures. Coming together, these changes reflect the ongoing process of the Governmental 
formulation of a nation, a national identity, and a self (or lack thereof).  
Let me present this theoretical argument through the process I have presented in this 
paper.  With the uprising of the Israeli Black Panthers in March 1971, the Israeli public and its 
political establishment were certainly not surprised with the actual claims of discrimination and 
inequality the various cultures in the Jewish –Israeli community were a known and accepted fact.  
The Black Panthers, hence, did not bring a new and unknown problem into the Israeli reality; 
what they brought was a new form of action. The choice of the Black Panthers’ name, language, 
and forms of action all brought a new dimension of social and political discourse to Israel. The 
discourse that was, in part, exposed in this paper reflected a change in societal truths and beliefs, 
and, eventually, brought a change in the perception of governmental power.  By 1973, The initial 
attraction of the Black Panthers faded, and instead came a softer message, highlighting the need 
for education and better educational services, and, respectively, educational integration. 
Education was now perceived as a tool to obtain governmental power and control.  
When presenting these perceptions of discourse and culture, another layer becomes 
apparent: that of power, as such. Power can be perceived through an understanding of the role 
and nature of the “political” in social life. This perception regards a variety of settings as 
“political settings”:  Politics and political power are inscribed in the texture of everyday life as 
much as they are within such “purely” political settings as ministries or public offices. Power can 
be executed as physical force, of course, but it can also be the power of knowledge making, the 
construction of truth, and the inscribing of societal norms. 
The most apparent struggle over the creation, and constant re-creation, of power would 
naturally take place between the “political” and the “cultural” settings. If, to echo Foucault, 
politics is analyzed on the basis of the state, then the political establishment, almost by 
definition, must assume commonalities. Any national government assumes a common basis of 
national identity upon which the existence of a nation is formulated. By government, in this case, 
I am referring to the major political parties or organizations that have considerable influence on 
the legislature and the apparatus of the state. Without these political assumptions, control would 
be impossible. This is also why it is of major interest for any government to sustain these 
commonalities and, at times of crisis, to reinforce them. By consequence—sustaining these 
commonalities would imply the erosion of difference. 
It is between the insistence on commonalities of the political power, on the one hand, and 
the struggle for differences of civil society, on the other, that national discourses evolve. 
In fact, from a theoretical perspective, the Panthers’ initial organization was a civil 
movement that demanded that the political establishment finally acknowledge the existence of a 
difference between the various groups in Israel. More specifically, it was a call to acknowledge 
the existence of a difference based on ethnicity—an ethnic otherness. The reaction of the 
government, by contrast, was one that struggled to undermine this difference: as stated earlier 
this is the heart of the existence of ‘nationality’ as such: the ongoing shifts of power between the 
civil society and the government.  But in this specific case, the government’s struggle was 
overshadowed by a different underlying theme: that of the colonial ideology that was as 
pervasive (at least) as the dream of a homogenized Jewish society. The only possible solution for 
both the Mizrachi struggle and the “national mission” of the government was to create a societal 
space in which the otherness would be accepted and, at the same time, the hegemonic center 
would be kept.  In effect, the discussion of educational integration during the years 1970-1973 
became the means of establishing the center. This was the reason it quickly became a discourse 
that was “good for all”: it enabled the government and the Mizrachi political organizations to act 
each according to their different centers at the same time and within the same political discourse. 
In fact, these centers gradually turned into A Center in which differences were acknowledged 
and driven into what was meant to be a homogenizing process. 
The discourse of ethnicity in Israel changed again after the Yom Kippur war of 1973, and 
shifted considerably during the years 1974-1977, creating a political rupture in 1977 that has 
changed the political realities in Israel since. But throughout these changes, the political 
discussion and governmental actions in regard to ethnic differences among Jews in Israel were 
always very closely connected to educational and school reforms. 
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